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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Believing that his employee Rebecca Doby was suicidal, 
James DeCrescenzo filed a petition with the Bucks County 
Department of Mental Health to have her examined 
involuntarily under section 7302 of the Pennsylvania 
Mental Health Procedures Act. The appropriate county 
official granted the petition and issued a warrant 
instructing the local police to bring Doby to a nearby 
hospital for a psychiatric evaluation; this evaluation led to 
her involuntary five-day commitment. Claiming that her 
federal rights to due process and freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated, 
Doby and her husband, Herbert Doby, brought suit under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 against the individuals involved in her 
commitment, including DeCrescenzo, the county, certain of 
its officials, the police officers who executed the warrant, 
and an evaluating doctor. The district court dismissed 
portions of the Dobys' case, entered judgment as a matter 
of law for the defendants before or at the trial on other 
claims, and subsequently denied the Dobys' post-trial 
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motions for a new trial and for other relief. The Dobys 
appeal, arguing primarily that Bucks County relies upon an 
unconstitutional policy in processing petitions for 
involuntary examinations. After evaluation of the many 
issues involved in this case we have concluded that the 
county's policy in enforcing the Mental Health Procedures 
Act is constitutional, and that there is no other reason to 
reverse the orders or judgments on appeal. Consequently, 
we will affirm. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the Dobys' section 
1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over their related state law claims 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Because the Dobys appeal from 
final orders of the district court, we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
The chain of events at the center of this appeal 
commenced when Doby handed a letter to DeCrescenzo on 
December 22, 1993. At the time, Doby had worked for 
DeCrescenzo's court reporting agency for two years. She 
alleges that during her employment her relationship with 
DeCrescenzo had become intimate and included several 
instances of sexual contact but not sexual intercourse. 
DeCrescenzo denies that his relationship with Doby 
extended beyond friendship. 
 
The letter in question was lengthy, 11 pages in total, and 
personal. It referred to abuse suffered by Doby during her 
childhood and described sexual conduct in which Doby 
wished to engage with DeCrescenzo. At the letter's 
conclusion, Doby also wrote that she had accomplished 
what she was intended to do in this lifetime and was 
"leaving." Alarmed by the letter's contents, DeCrescenzo 
consulted with his wife, his marriage counselor, and his 
attorney. Dr. Linda Edelstein, his marriage counselor, 
advised him that the letter's author was in psychiatric 
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distress, potentially suicidal, and needed the immediate 
assistance of mental health professionals. On her advice, 
DeCrescenzo spoke with personnel of the Philadelphia 
mental health office who suggested that they could send a 
mobile emergency crisis team to meet with Doby. Without 
consulting Doby, DeCrescenzo arranged for the crisis team 
to come to his office on December 30, 1993. 
 
However, on December 30, Doby left the office before the 
mobile emergency crisis team arrived. From her car phone, 
she placed a call to a co-worker, Kathy McHugh, to advise 
her that she would not attend McHugh's New Year's Eve 
party. Doby was upset and crying, indicated that she was 
driving in the rain, and would not tell McHugh where she 
was going. McHugh reported this conversation to 
DeCrescenzo who then called Doby to ask her to return to 
the office. Doby refused and indicated that she did not want 
to speak to him. 
 
DeCrescenzo then called the Philadelphia mental health 
office and the Warrington Township police. At the 
suggestion of the mental health office, he also contacted 
Herbert Doby and read to him several phrases from Doby's 
letter. Concerned for his wife, Herbert Doby called her on 
the car phone but their conversation convinced him that 
nothing was wrong. Doby then phoned DeCrescenzo to 
assure him that she was not in danger. 
 
Unsure of what to do next, DeCrescenzo again phoned 
the Warrington Township Police Department. At their 
suggestion, DeCrescenzo asked his wife and Kathy McHugh 
to search Doby's work area for other indications of her 
mental state. This search revealed a suicide note Doby 
authored, which begins "If you are receiving this letter it is 
because I am gone, and I seek your help for Herb and my 
girls." The search also uncovered written reminders to 
make arrangements for organ donation and the custody of 
Doby's daughter and step-daughter. The defendants claim 
that DeCrescenzo brought these writings when he later 
applied for a warrant to have Doby involuntarily examined 
on an emergency basis. 
 
After discovering the suicide note, DeCrescenzo went to 
the Doylestown Hospital to petition to have Doby 
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involuntarily examined according to the guidelines of the 
Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"), Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7101 et seq. (West Supp. 1998). During 
his drive to the hospital, he received another call from 
Herbert Doby informing him that Doby was fine. 
 
Section 7302 of the MHPA permits the issuance of a 
warrant for an involuntary emergency examination. It 
states: 
 
       Upon written application by a physician or other 
       responsible party setting forth facts constituting 
       reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely 
       mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, 
       the county administrator may issue a warrant 
       requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace 
       officer, to take such a person to the facility specified in 
       the warrant. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S7302(a)(1). According to the statute 
a person may be "severely mentally disabled" if he or she 
"poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to 
[himself/herself.]" Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50,S7301(a). In turn, 
clear and present danger is shown if "within the past 30 
days . . . the person has made threats to commit suicide 
and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the 
threat to commit suicide." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
S7301(b)(2)(ii). The statute also provides that a physician 
must examine a person brought in under a section 7302 
warrant within two hours of her arrival at the facility. Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(b). If the physician performing the 
involuntary examination determines that the individual is 
severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate 
treatment, the individual may be involuntarily committed to 
begin treatment for a period not to exceed 120 hours. The 
period of commitment, however, may be extended in certain 
circumstances. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 S 7302(b). 
 
Upon reaching the hospital, DeCrescenzo met with Amy 
Bryant, a crisis worker for Lenape Valley Foundation 
("LVF"), which processes petitions for involuntary 
examinations for Bucks County. In his discussion with 
Bryant, DeCrescenzo presented her with an undated copy 
of the 11-page letter and stated that he had found a suicide 
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note that day on Doby's desk. Bryant's recorded the 
information provided by DeCrescenzo on the section 7302 
application: 
 
       I believe that Rebecca Doby is in need of emergency 
       psychiatric care. Today I found an extensive suicide 
       note on her desk, as well as lists of chores including 
       transferences of information to her husband about 
       access to bank accounts, insurance policy bills, a 
       shared storage shed, and her current status with my 
       company. She also has written a reminder to call about 
       organ donations. Rebecca asked me as well to lock 
       away a file for her with a note attached instructing me 
       to destroy it if anything should happen to her. She also 
       has begun letters to friends and relatives, with 
       envelopes already addressed, asking either for 
       forgiveness for pain she caused or including pleas for 
       their help with the raising of her children. The return 
       address is to a P.O. Box which only lists the names of 
       her husband and children. In the past few weeks 
       Rebecca has been drastically less efficient at work and 
       often retires to a cot to sleep during working hours. 
       She has access to guns and has a license to carry one 
       herself; she also talks a great deal about guns. I truly 
       fear for her safety. 
 
DeCrescenzo did not recount the events of the day 
specifically, nor did he relate the Dobys' repeated claims 
that day that Doby was not in danger. After recording 
DeCrescenzo's application, Bryant consulted by telephone 
with Debbie Neidhardt of the Bucks County Department of 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation. During this 
conversation, Bryant read the section 7302 application to 
Neidhardt and, as required by section 7102 of the MHPA, 
inquired whether involuntary emergency treatment was the 
least restrictive alternative available.1  After a 14-minute 
discussion, Neidhardt authorized the issuance of a section 
7302 warrant for Doby's examination.2 Bryant then signed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 7102 of the MHPA provides: "Treatment on a voluntary basis 
shall be preferred to involuntary treatment; and in every case, the least 
restrictions consistent with adequate treatment shall be employed." Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S7102. 
 
2. Although the Dobys argued that neither Bryant nor Neidhardt could 
have seen the suicide note because it was not part of the hospital's file 
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the warrant on Neidhardt's behalf, and DeCrescenzo 
delivered it to the Warrington Township Police Department. 
 
Three police officers, Joseph Knox, Michael Neipp and 
Kenneth Hawthorn, arrived at the Dobys' apartment at 
approximately 7:00 p.m. to execute the warrant. After Doby 
answered their knock, they asked her to step outside. The 
parties disagree on whether the officers then explained to 
her why they were taking her into custody. 
 
After Doby refused to accompany the officers and 
attempted to reenter the apartment to speak to her 
husband, the officers "grabbed" her. When she began to 
kick at the apartment door, they handcuffed her, and after 
she continued to resist forcefully, they shackled her and 
carried her to the police car. One officer, Hawthorn, stayed 
behind to speak with Herbert Doby. After he left the 
apartment, he entered the police car and drove Doby to 
Doylestown Hospital. 
 
At the hospital, Dr. John Richards examined Doby. 
During the examination, they discussed the 11-page letter 
and Doby's feelings towards DeCrescenzo. Doby admitted to 
Dr. Richards that she had been depressed most of her life 
but claimed that she functioned very well. She also told 
him that she had been seeing a psychiatrist who had 
prescribed Prozac to treat her depression, but that she 
recently had stopped taking the medication. When Dr. 
Richards asked Doby whether she needed help, she 
admitted that she did but refused voluntary treatment. The 
examination ended when Doby asked to phone her 
husband and her psychiatrist and Dr. Richards agreed. Dr. 
Richards involuntarily committed Doby for a period not to 
exceed 120 hours. 
 
On the following day, another physician, who is not a 
defendant in this suit, examined Doby, concluded that she 
was mentally disabled, and thus decided not to release her. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
on Doby, the district court noted that Neidhardt's deposition testimony 
contradicted this assertion. Neidhardt testified that she remembered 
hearing specific provisions of the two-page note during her conversation 
with Bryant. 
 
                                11 
  
On January 3, 1994, Doby signed voluntary commitment 
papers on the understanding that doing so would lead to 
her release on the following day. Doby was in fact released 
on January 4, 1994. 
 
Claiming that the involuntary commitment violated their 
rights under federal and state law, the Dobys filed this 
action in June 1994 against DeCrescenzo, the Lenape 
Valley Foundation and Amy Bryant, the Bucks County 
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 
Philip M. Fenster, the county administrator, and Debbie 
Neidhardt, the Township of Warrington, the Warrington 
Township Police Department, Chief John Bonargo, Sergeant 
Joseph Knox, Officer Michael Neipp, and Officer Kenneth 
Hawthorn, Dr. John C. Richards, and Doylestown Hospital. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
In their complaint, the Dobys alleged a violation of their 
civil rights under section 1983, false arrest and 
imprisonment, assault and battery, conspiracy, gross 
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
loss of consortium against all the defendants and sought a 
declaratory judgment that section 7302(a)(1) is 
unconstitutional. Additionally, they pled an invasion of 
privacy claim against DeCrescenzo, the county defendants, 
the foundation defendants, and the police defendants. 
Finally, the Dobys alleged defamation and wrongful use of 
civil proceedings against DeCrescenzo. 
 
In an order of June 27, 1995, the district court, by Judge 
Rendell, dismissed the section 1983 claim against Dr. 
Richards and the conspiracy claims against all the 
defendants. Then, following extensive discovery, the parties 
cross-moved for summary judgment, and the district court, 
again by Judge Rendell, addressed their claims in a 
memorandum opinion and order dated September 9, 1996. 
The court dismissed claims against the foundation 
defendants, the county defendants, Doylestown Hospital, 
and Dr. Richards. The court also denied the Dobys' motion 
for summary judgment, which requested a ruling that the 
municipal defendants and individual defendants sued in 
their official capacity were liable as a matter of law under 
section 1983 because the Dobys had shown a custom or 
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policy of causing constitutional violations. However, it 
allowed the Dobys to proceed with some of their claims 
against DeCrescenzo and the police defendants. 
 
Specifically, the court refused to dismiss the defamation, 
invasion of privacy, false arrest or imprisonment, gross 
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims against DeCrescenzo. The court also allowed the 
Dobys to proceed against the police defendants on their 
section 1983 claims based on excessive force and against 
the individual police officers on claims of gross negligence 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Dobys 
appeal from this September 9, 1996 order, insofar as it was 
unfavorable to them. 
 
The remaining claims were tried on liability to a jury 
starting on January 21, 1998. At the close of the Dobys' 
case, the district court, by Judge Fullam, granted the police 
defendants a judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the jury 
deliberated only on certain claims against DeCrescenzo and 
ultimately returned a verdict on special interrogatories 
finding him liable for simple negligence but finding in his 
favor on all other counts. The jury, however, did not make 
a damages award. DeCrescenzo immediately moved for a 
judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted his 
motion, ruling that the evidence did not support the simple 
negligence verdict. The Dobys timely filed post-trial motions 
requesting reconsideration of certain earlier orders, 
amendment of the verdict, and a new trial, but the district 
court denied the motions in a memorandum and order on 
March 10, 1998. The Dobys appeal from this order as well. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary 
   Judgment to the Municipal Defendants on the Dobys' 
   Official Capacity Claims? 
 
Despite the Dobys' wide-ranging claims in their 
complaint, their appeal focuses on six of the district court's 
rulings. The first ruling that the Dobys contest is the grant 
of summary judgment to LVF and the county on the official 
capacity claims. The first three issues briefed by the Dobys 
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revolve around this ruling.3 Thus, the initial question before 
us is whether the district court erred in concluding that 
LVF and the county were not liable to the Dobys because 
they had no established custom or policy that caused a 
constitutional deprivation. Because this first issue requires 
us to review the grant of summary judgment, our review is 
plenary and we must draw all reasonable factual inferences 
in favor of the Dobys, the non-moving party. See Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
       1. The existence of a municipal custom or policy 
 
The district court correctly ruled that the Dobys could 
recover under section 1983 on their official capacity claims 
against the county defendants only if they showed that the 
defendants had maintained a policy or custom that caused 
a deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 
2018, 2037-38 (1978). The Dobys argue that the county 
defendants did have a custom or policy and that this policy 
was unconstitutional. Specifically, they argue (i) that 
allowing any individual, rather than only mental health 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Dobys repeatedly rely on Pennsylvania courts' interpretations of 
Pennsylvania's constitutional provisions in making their argument that 
Doby's constitutional rights were violated. However, we must determine 
the liability of the county defendants under section 1983 according to 
federal law. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 
2693 (1979). Moreover, the district court dismissed all the state law 
claims against LVF and the county based on their immunity from such 
claims under section 7114(a) of the MHPA, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114, 
and the Dobys have not appealed this ruling. Thus, the only valid issue 
for appeal raised by the first three sections of the Dobys' brief is 
whether 
the county and LVF had a custom or policy of enforcing the MHPA in a 
manner that caused Doby to suffer a violation of her federal 
constitutional rights to due process and freedom from unreasonable 
seizures. 
 
The Dobys may be arguing that the MHPA itself creates substantive 
rights that cannot be withdrawn without violating federal constitutional 
guarantees. The only such right that is briefed substantially, however, is 
the right to have only physicians or other mental health professionals 
petition for section 7302 warrants. As discussed below, we do not believe 
that the MHPA creates this right because we disagree with the Dobys' 
statutory interpretation. 
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professionals, to petition for an involuntary examination is 
unconstitutional; (ii) that warrants for involuntary 
examinations must be based on probable cause, which 
requires reliable informants, independent investigation, 
neutral and detached decision makers, and a warrant that 
is signed and sealed. 
 
The district court dismissed the official capacity claims 
against LVF and the county because it concluded that the 
Dobys' allegation of a single act of constitutional violation, 
Doby's involuntary examination, could not constitute a 
custom or policy. We are of the view that this ruling 
misapplied Monell. In concluding that the Dobys had failed 
to allege a custom or policy because they claimed only a 
single violation, the district court stated that a custom or 
policy is found only when a "municipality must have 
known, or reasonably should have realized, from the nature 
of its conduct or from actual past violation, that its 
practices were causing or likely to cause violations of 
constitutional rights, and permitted these practices to 
occur." In constructing this definition, the court relied on 
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990). In 
Bielevicz, however, the city had no express policy on the 
pertinent issue and the plaintiff therefore was attempting to 
prove that one official's misconduct was not an isolated 
occurrence. See id. In contrast, it cannot be doubted that 
the county and LVF maintained a custom or policy 
concerning applications for involuntary examinations. 
 
LVF's written "Involuntary Commitment Procedure" 
expressly foresees accepting petitions from non-physicians 
and obtaining approval for the warrant from the county by 
telephone. Moreover, it instructs the crisis worker to 
"document" the behavior witnessed by the petitioner 
without making any mention of investigation. The 
defendants have not disputed that this is in fact how the 
county and LVF process petitions for involuntary 
examinations. When a plaintiff is challenging the 
constitutionality of a policy or custom itself, Bielevicz does 
not require him or her to allege a sequence of constitutional 
deprivations; the claim that the policy resulted in the 
plaintiff suffering such a deprivation satisfies Monell. See 
id. at 850-51. The district court therefore erred in 
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dismissing the Dobys' official capacity claims on the ground 
that they had failed to allege a custom or policy. 
 
The question remains, however, whether the defendants' 
method of processing petitions truly can be considered a 
county, rather than a state, policy because when a county 
is merely enforcing state law, without adopting any 
particular policy of its own, it cannot be held liable under 
the Monell line of cases. See Surplus Store and Exch., Inc. v. 
City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788, 790-92 (7th Cir. 1991); cf. 
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364-66 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (stating that municipality would be held liable 
under Monell where state law authorized police officers to 
use deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons but 
municipality adopted a policy explaining when such force 
could be used). We seem not to have considered specifically 
whether municipalities or counties can be liable for 
enforcing state law, but in one decision we did approve a 
suit against a county where county sheriffs had garnished 
the plaintiffs' bank accounts based on a state statute. See 
Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 53-55 (3d Cir. 1980). We 
did not decide Finberg under Monell, however, because 
there the plaintiffs were seeking only a declaratory 
judgment that the state statute was unconstitutional. See 
id. at 53. 
 
Without addressing the county/state policy distinction 
specifically, the Dobys clearly have framed their arguments 
to focus on the actions of the county. They do not argue 
that section 7302 as written is itself unconstitutional; 
rather they claim that LVF and the county have enforced it 
in an unconstitutional manner by permitting warrants to be 
issued by telephone based on uncorroborated information 
supplied by individuals who are not mental health 
professionals. The Dobys' suggestion that the enforcement 
procedures should be considered a municipal or county, 
rather than a state, policy has merit; because the statute 
itself does not specify how the county delegate is to receive 
information and issue warrants, LVF and the county 
presumably have some discretion in deciding how to 
implement the warrant application procedure. The Garner 
court found the existence of such discretion determinative 
in deciding that a municipality could be held liable for 
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enforcing the use of deadly force by its police officers. 
Ultimately, however, we believe that we need not decide 
whether a county or state policy is at issue because we 
conclude that the enforcement policy adopted by LVF and 
the county is constitutional. 
 
       2. Does the county's policy violate the Fourteenth 
       Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourth 
       Amendment? 
 
The Dobys do not contend that it is unconstitutional for 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to permit the 
involuntary examination of those individuals who appear to 
pose an immediate danger to themselves or others. Indeed, 
they repeatedly commend the State for drafting a statute 
that balances the need to provide treatment to the seriously 
ill against the civil rights of those in need of such 
treatment. The Dobys quarrel only with the enforcement of 
the statute in two respects: (i) that LVF and the county 
accept petitions for warrants from any individual, rather 
than only from mental health professionals; (ii) that the 
county delegate who decides whether to issue the warrant 
does not interview the petitioner personally, performs no 
investigation of the petitioner's claims, and permits the 
crisis worker to sign the warrant on his or her behalf. The 
district court relied on a well-analyzed and thoughtful 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
ruling that this enforcement policy is constitutional. See 
McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv. Inc., 77 F.3d 540 (1st 
Cir. 1996). 
 
We deal first with a statutory interpretation contention 
the Dobys raise. They devote a considerable portion of their 
brief to arguing that statutory interpretation principles 
require us to interpret the phrase "physician or other 
responsible party" in section 7302(a)(1) to mean physician 
or other mental health professional. The decisive factor 
weighing against their interpretation is that it contradicts 
the relevant state agency's construction. The application 
form for requesting a warrant for a section 7302 
examination does not limit the class of petitioners to mental 
health professionals like physicians; it states: "Part I must 
be completed by the person who believes the patient is in 
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need of treatment. If this person is not a physician, police 
officer, the County Administrator or his delegate . . . ." This 
form is created by the state agency in charge of overseeing 
the implementation of the MHPA. Pennsylvania cases 
provide that courts must defer to an administrative 
agency's interpretation of a statute unless that 
interpretation is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Frey v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 930, 933 (Pa. Super. 
1993). Given the Legislature's use of the phrase "other 
responsible party" rather than a phrase like "other health 
care professional," the agency's interpretation of the statute 
is not clearly erroneous and therefore merits our deference. 
 
The Dobys' first constitutional argument is that 
permitting individuals other than mental health 
professionals to petition for a section 7302 warrant violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
They contend that permitting "anyone" to petition for such 
a warrant, particularly when the petitioner's statements are 
not investigated independently, will lead to arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty as the petitioner may have improper 
motives for seeking the involuntary examination. In 
circumstances where anyone can petition for a warrant, 
they argue, an individual must be granted the right to 
notice and a hearing before an involuntary examination is 
conducted. 
 
It is important to note the narrowness of the Dobys' 
arguments: they do not doubt that Pennsylvania has a 
legitimate interest in providing for the involuntary 
examination of dangerous individuals and that the federal 
constitution does not prohibit it from legislating procedures 
to enforce this interest. A contrary argument would be 
difficult to support as the Supreme Court has held that a 
state, in conformity with the Due Process Clause, may 
confine mentally ill individuals if it shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that the individuals are ill and 
dangerous to themselves or others. See Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992) 
(citations omitted). The Dobys argue, however, that 
permitting non-physicians to apply for such warrants 
converts a constitutional process into an unconstitutional 
one. This argument does not withstand scrutiny. 
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As is made clear by the title of section 7302 of the MHPA, 
the procedure was created to allow the counties to handle 
emergency situations. Courts have stated repeatedly that 
due process is a flexible notion and that what kind of 
process is due depends on the individual and state 
interests at stake. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Bush, 494 U.S. 
113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 984 (1980). It may be reasonable, 
therefore, for a state to omit a provision for notice and a 
hearing in a statute created to deal with emergencies, 
particularly where the deprivation at issue, in this case 
detention for a maximum of several hours to permit an 
examination, continues for only a short period of time. See 
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19, 
98 S.Ct. 1554, 1565 (1978) (stating that "[o]n occasion, this 
Court has recognized that where the potential length or 
severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of 
serious loss and where the procedures underlying the 
decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk 
of erroneous determination, government may act without 
providing additional `advance procedural safeguards' "). 
 
Indeed, the Dobys recognize the State's need to act 
quickly in emergencies but nevertheless claim that notice 
and a hearing must be provided in cases where the 
petitioner is not a physician because the information 
provided by non-physicians is unreliable. The Dobys have 
not demonstrated, however, that non-physicians as a class 
are inherently unreliable fact informants. Furthermore, the 
Dobys misapprehend the role of a petitioner by suggesting 
that a physician is more competent than a non-physician to 
decide when conduct is "dangerous." Although their 
contention may be true, under the structure of section 
7302, the petitioners themselves are not making clinical 
determinations about an individual's mental state; instead, 
it is the county delegate, a trained mental health 
professional, who has the duty to decide whether the 
information provided by the petitioner constitutes grounds 
for issuing a warrant. The Dobys offer no convincing reason 
why non-physicians cannot be trusted to relay information 
to a person competent to judge such information under the 
appropriate clinical standards. Moreover, it is likely that a 
person other than a physician or a mental health 
professional will have the material information. 
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Additionally, section 7302 specifies that the county 
should make decisions based on information provided by a 
physician or "other responsible party." In the district court 
the county presented testimony that each warrant 
application is handled as it arises in order to guard against 
individuals "who appear impaired in some way." The Dobys 
have not proffered any evidence to suggest that LVF and 
the county have a practice of issuing warrants when a 
petitioner seems clearly imbalanced or otherwise impaired. 
 
Further, the application procedure itself has a built-in 
safeguard to prevent ill-motivated individuals from seeking 
the involuntary examination of others: the face of the 
application includes a clear statement providing that 
anyone who supplies false information to the county may 
be prosecuted criminally. In conformity with that policy, 
Bryant informed DeCrescenzo that providing false 
information on the application would constitute a 
misdemeanor. Again, the Dobys have failed to explain why 
it is unconstitutional to permit responsible individuals to 
report about the actions of others when a mental health 
professional is entrusted with judging the import of such 
reports. Thus, the Dobys' claim that permitting non- 
physicians to apply for warrants transforms a procedure 
that is sound under the Due Process Clause to one that is 
unsound is unpersuasive.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Dobys also appear to claim substantive due process violations. "A 
substantive due process violation is established if the government's 
actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government interest or 
were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive." Sameric 
Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d 
Cir. 
1998) (citations omitted). Our conclusion below that the MHPA 
authorizes seizures that are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment 
establishes that the MHPA meets the rationality test imposed by 
substantive due process analysis. Furthermore, there is no basis in the 
record to conclude that the LVF or county defendants' actions were not 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest or were motivated 
by bias, bad faith, or improper motive. Indeed, the jury answered special 
interrogatories finding in favor of DeCrescenzo himself on the Dobys' 
claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, false arrest and detention, 
gross negligence/willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. In the circumstances it is quite clear that 
DeCrescenzo was pursuing a legitimate interest in this matter. 
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The Dobys' second constitutional arguments, which they 
base on the Fourth Amendment, are equally unconvincing, 
and thus the district court correctly dismissed them based 
on the "special need" exception to the probable cause and 
warrant requirements. The Dobys claim that warrants for 
involuntary examinations must be based on probable 
cause, and therefore contend that the county must conform 
to the requirements imposed by criminal law before it 
authorizes the police to take custody of a mentally ill 
individual for an involuntary examination.5 
 
The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures in civil, as 
well as criminal, proceedings. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 
U.S. 709, 714-15, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496 (1987). The 
fundamental inquiry in such proceedings, however, remains 
whether the government's conduct is reasonable under the 
circumstances. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 
439-40, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527 (1973). 
 
Although it was discussing a search rather than a 
seizure, the Supreme Court has held that states may act 
without obtaining a warrant and without probable cause in 
situations where "special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987) (citations omitted). 
Construing Griffin, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held that the temporary involuntary commitment of those 
deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a 
"special need" permitting the state to act without a warrant. 
See McCabe, 77 F.3d at 549. We agree. 
 
Requiring the county to seek a warrant from a magistrate 
in a situation where the county delegate has determined 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe in an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Dobys have not explained how their Fourth Amendment challenge 
implicates a municipal or county, rather than a state, policy. The MHPA 
clearly permits seizures of mentally ill individuals without requiring 
county officials to apply to a magistrate for a warrant that would be 
issued only upon probable cause. Instead, the statute creates an 
alternative warrant scheme. We continue to assume, however, for 
purposes of this opinion, that the county and LVF's actions in enforcing 
this statute could be deemed a county policy. 
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individual's "clear and present" dangerousness would entail 
delays with potentially life-threatening consequences. As 
discussed above, by its terms, section 7302 applies only in 
emergencies. Such emergency cases present a situation 
where seeking a warrant is systemically impracticable. 
 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court suggested in Griffin, a 
magistrate's authorization is less desirable in cases where 
non-judicial expertise is involved, such as determining the 
amount of supervision necessary for a probationer. See 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 879 n.6, 107 S.Ct. at 3170, 3172 
n.6. The same reasoning applies where a county delegate 
trained in a mental health field, rather than a magistrate 
judge trained in the law, renders the decision of whether an 
individual requires an emergency involuntary examination. 
Although the Dobys suggest that such a determination is 
unreliable when made by a county delegate on the 
telephone without a face-to-face interview with the 
petitioner, this argument again ignores the emergency 
nature of section 7302 warrants. Furthermore, this 
argument ignores the fact that magistrate judges often 
issue warrants based on information supplied by police 
officers who themselves are relying on absent informants. 
 
Although we find that the "special need" exception 
applies to the county's conduct under the MHPA, we 
nevertheless must examine whether the procedures 
followed by the county are reasonable under the 
circumstances. Fourth Amendment doctrine provides that 
"the shorter the detention, the less compelling is the 
evidence of the necessity for it that the authorities need to 
produce." Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 
1992) (citations omitted). Because the Dobys contest the 
issuance of the section 7302 warrant, it is important to 
focus on the deprivation of liberty caused by the execution 
of the warrant itself. The MHPA requires that a physician 
examine a detained individual within two hours of his or 
her arrival at a hospital; therefore, that individual's liberty 
will be curtailed for at most several hours unless a 
physician independently concludes that the individual is 
mentally disabled and in need of involuntary treatment. See 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(b). Given the brief detention 
authorized, the warrant procedures provide important 
 
                                22 
  
safeguards to protect individuals' rights. First, the warrant 
is authorized by a neutral and detached official, the county 
delegate. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(a)(1); see 
McCabe, 77 F.3d at 552 (interpreting Supreme Court 
precedent to require neutral and detached decision-maker 
to authorize search or seizure in special needs exceptions to 
the warrant and probable cause requirement). Second, the 
county issues a warrant only when information presented 
by a "responsible party" convinces a trained county 
delegate that reasonable grounds exist to belief that an 
individual poses a clear and present danger to him/herself 
or others. Id.; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50,S 7301(a). 
 
Because the section 7302 procedures exist to respond to 
emergency cases, it is reasonable for the county delegate to 
consult with the crisis workers over the telephone and to 
issue such warrants without independent investigation. The 
statutory requirement that the individual appear 
"responsible" and the warning on the application form that 
false statements can subject a petitioner to criminal 
prosecution are sufficient safeguards in light of the 
circumstances to assure the reliability of information 
communicated to the delegate. We therefore reject the 
Dobys' Fourth Amendment challenge.6 
 
B. Did the District Court Err in Granting a Judgment as 
       a Matter of Law to DeCrescenzo on the Negligence 
       Issue? 
 
The jury returned a verdict in DeCrescenzo's favor on all 
claims, including gross negligence/willful misconduct, 
except simple negligence. The district court, however, 
granted a judgment as a matter of law on the negligence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Once again, the Dobys rely on Pennsylvania law in their section 1983 
argument, suggesting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected 
the "special need" exception for state statutes authorizing a seizure. See 
Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992). Even if the court's 
ruling in Kohl could be relevant to the federal analysis under section 
1983, the Dobys misinterpret Kohl. This decision does not purport to 
renounce categorically the "special need" exception; instead it simply 
states that, under federal law, the exception does not apply in cases 
where "the governmental interest to be advanced is the normal need for 
law enforcement." Kohl, 615 A.2d at 314. 
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claim primarily because it concluded that there was simply 
no evidence to support the verdict. It also found, however, 
that the Dobys had not shown proximate cause between 
the alleged negligence and Doby's injury. Subsequently on 
the Dobys' post-trial motions it ruled that DeCrescenzo was 
immune from a claim of simple negligence under section 
7114 of the MHPA. 
 
We will affirm the district court's ruling on this because 
we agree with Judge Fullam's conclusion that DeCrescenzo 
qualifies for immunity under section 7114. This section 
provides in relevant part that: 
 
       In the absence of willful misconduct or gross 
       negligence, a county administrator, a director of a 
       facility, a physician, a peace officer or any other 
       authorized person who participates in a decision that a 
       person be examined or treated under this act . . . shall 
       not be civilly or criminally liable for such decision or 
       for any of its consequences. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114(a). Because DeCrescenzo was 
the responsible person who initiated the involuntary 
examination proceedings under section 7302, we hold that 
he qualifies as an "authorized person who participate[d] in 
a decision that a person be examined." See id. 
 
Judge Rendell concluded otherwise in her summary 
judgment order because she interpreted McNamara v. 
Schleifer Ambulance Serv., Inc., 556 A.2d 448 (Pa. Super. 
1989) to limit "participa[nts] in a decision" to those with 
mental health training. We recognize that McNamara 
contains language suggesting that section 7114 only 
applies to mental health professionals. See McNamara, 556 
A.2d at 449-50 (stating that "the legislature contemplated 
the decision-making process under S 7114 as one which 
would take place within the context of treatment, care, 
diagnosis or rehabilitation. It is equally clear that the 
individuals who would participate in those decisions would 
be trained in the field of mental health."). But the issue in 
McNamara was whether ambulance drivers transporting a 
mental health patient qualified for immunity under the 
MHPA. See id. at 449. Thus, the implicit question 
addressed in that case was what kind of medical personnel 
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would qualify for immunity. The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court reasonably concluded that only individuals with 
mental health training, and thus those that actually had 
participated in the assessment of the patient's mental state, 
qualified for immunity. 
 
In contrast, the issue posed by this appeal is whether the 
individual who applies for a section 7302 warrant can be 
deemed to be a participant in the decision-making process 
to involuntarily examine the patient. We believe the answer 
to this question must be "yes" because section 7114 
explicitly includes peace officers within its immunity 
provision. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114. Given the 
statutory scheme, it is difficult to imagine what role peace 
officers could play in a decision to examine or treat an 
individual other than to report information of dangerous 
conduct observed by them. Because this is precisely what 
DeCrescenzo did in this case, we find that he, like a peace 
officer, qualifies for immunity under section 7114 unless he 
engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence. The 
district court, therefore, correctly granted judgment as a 
matter of law to DeCrescenzo on the simple negligence claim.7 
 
C. Did the District Court Err in Entering a Judgment as 
       a Matter of Law for the Police Defendants on the 
       Claims of Excessive Force? 
 
In considering the judgment as a matter of law for the 
police defendants our review is plenary. See Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). In 
conducting our review, we apply the same standard relied 
upon by the district court. See id. This standard requires 
us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and to deny a defendant's motion for 
a judgment as a matter of law if there is evidence 
reasonably supporting recovery by the plaintiffs. 
 
At the close of the Dobys' case, the district court granted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We also agree with the district court that the evidence could not 
support a verdict on a negligence theory in favor of the Dobys against 
DeCrescenzo. The district court also concluded that the Dobys' pleadings 
did not include a claim for simple negligence so that the verdict for that 
reason as well could not stand. We do not reach that issue. 
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a judgment as a matter of law to the police defendants on 
the excessive force claims because it ruled that no rational 
jury could find in the Dobys' favor on these claims. The 
court explained: "[b]y the plaintiff's own testimony, she was 
not mistreated. Under plaintiff's own testimony, she did 
kick and scream. So that I don't think any rational jury 
could say it was unreasonable for them to subdue her and 
then to get her to the hospital." 
 
In analyzing claims of excessive force under the Fourth 
Amendment, we must decide whether the actions of the 
police were "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also In re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1995). Significant 
factors in evaluating the force used by the police are 
whether the person being taken into custody is resisting or 
attempting to resist by flight. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 
109 S.Ct. at 1871-72. 
 
As the police officers argue, when they came to take Doby 
into custody they had to be prepared to handle an 
individual that the county delegate had determined posed a 
clear danger to herself or others. Further, the officers were 
aware that there were guns in the Dobys' home. Given 
these circumstances, Doby's own testimony establishes that 
the officers' actions were reasonable. 
 
Upon arrival at the Dobys' residence, the officers knocked 
on the door and requested that Doby step outside of the 
apartment. When the officers refused to tell her why she 
was being taken into custody, Doby made clear that she 
would not accompany them willingly and "became angry." 
She then attempted to return to the apartment, thus 
resisting, causing the officers to "grab" her. When she 
began to kick at the door and scream, the officers 
handcuffed her. When she continued to kick and scream, 
the officers shackled her. Once Doby arrived at the 
hospital, a female officer performed a pat-down search and 
Doby was placed in a wheelchair. Her handcuffs and 
shackles were removed once she promised to cooperate. 
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Doby's own testimony established that the police officers 
applied force in response to her attempts to resist, 
including kicking, screaming and flight. Moreover, they 
tailored each action taken to the type of resistance 
encountered: handcuffing to prevent flight, shackling to 
prevent kicking. We therefore conclude that the officers' 
actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law and 
will affirm the district court's order on the excessive force 
claims.8 
 
D. Did the District Court Err in Denying the Dobys' 
       Request for a Declaratory Judgment? 
 
The district court, by Judge Fullam, rejected the Dobys' 
motion for a judgment declaring the MHPA to be 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment. It ruled that 
the Dobys had abandoned this claim by failing to renew it 
before the trial and that, as a result, the court had not 
provided the Attorney General of Pennsylvania with the 
notice required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). We need not 
reach the issue of proper notice in order to affirm the 
district court's decision. As explained above, the statute is 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause and the 
Fourth Amendment even if non-physicians are allowed to 
petition for section 7302 warrants. Thus, the district court's 
refusal to rule on the declaratory judgment motion, even if 
it had been error, was harmless. 
 
E. Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in 
       Prohibiting Dobys' Expert Susan Bierker From 
       Testifying? 
 
We review the district court's rulings on the admissibility 
of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. See United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Dobys' claim that section 4422 of the Pennsylvania mental health 
statutes rendered the officers' actions illegal is meritless. See Pa. 
Stat. 
Ann. tit. 50, S 4422 (West 1969). Section 4422 provides that 
"[m]echanical restraints shall not be used or applied to a mentally 
disabled person, except: (1) When necessary to prevent such person from 
harming himself or others when being transported as provided in 
sections 405 or 421 . . . ." As discussed above, the restraints used by 
the 
police officers were necessary to prevent Doby from harming the officers 
or herself as a result of her resistance. 
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States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1998). The 
trial judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert 
testimony, based upon whether it is helpful to the trier of 
fact. See Bennett, 161 F.3d at 182. 
 
The district court, by Judge Fullam, excluded the 
testimony of Susan Bierker, a licensed clinical social worker 
who was prepared to opine that Doby had suffered post- 
traumatic stress disorder solely as a result of herfive-day 
involuntary commitment. The court concluded that Bierker 
was not qualified to render this opinion and that her 
opinion was based on a "seriously inaccurate" 
understanding of the facts. The Dobys claim that this was 
error. 
 
As the Dobys concede, Bierker's testimony was offered to 
prove the damages suffered by Doby. Because the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of DeCrescenzo on all claims 
other than simple negligence, and because the court 
correctly granted a judgment as a matter of law to 
DeCrescenzo on the simple negligence claim, there were no 
damages for the jury to calculate. Thus, any error by the 
district court in excluding Bierker's testimony is harmless. 
 
F. Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary 
       Judgment to Dr. Richards? 
 
The district court, by Judge Rendell, found that, because 
Dr. Richards qualified for immunity under section 7114 of 
the MHPA, he could be liable to the Dobys only if his 
conduct amounted to gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. The court ruled, as a matter of law, that the 
Dobys had not provided evidence sufficient to "establish 
flagrant behavior which grossly deviates from the standard 
of care required." 
 
The claim against Dr. Richards, of course, essentially 
related to his decision to commit Doby involuntarily rather 
than to the issuance of the warrant. The Dobys do not 
contest the district court's decision that, as a treating 
physician, Dr. Richards would be liable to them only for 
gross negligence/willful misconduct. Pennsylvania law 
defines gross negligence in the context of the MHPA as 
"facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than 
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ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or indifference. 
. . . The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly 
deviating from the ordinary standard of care." Albright v. 
Abington Memorial Hospital, 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. 
1997) (citation omitted). Further, willful misconduct exists 
when "the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so 
recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual 
intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a 
conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." 
Krivijanski v. Union R.R. Co., 515 A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Super. 
1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Dobys produced two expert reports, one from Dr. 
Paul S. Applebaum and the other from Dr. Eileen A. 
Bazelon, to support their contention that Dr. Richards had 
acted in a grossly negligent manner. Dr. Bazelon's report 
states: "Dr. Richards [did not act] in accordance with the 
customary or usual standard of care." She opines that by 
not questioning DeCrescenzo's motive or further 
questioning Herbert Doby and Doby's regular psychiatrist, 
Dr. Richards "deviated from the reasonable standard of 
care" and evidenced "complete disregard" for Doby's rights. 
Her report also acknowledges, however, that the content of 
Doby's writings was "frightening." 
 
This first report does not create a genuine factual dispute 
about Dr. Richards' gross negligence/willful misconduct. 
Dr. Bazelon merely states that Dr. Richards deviated from 
the standard of care, which might amount to ordinary 
negligence, but she does not use terms to suggest that this 
deviation was gross or flagrant. 
 
The second report, by Dr. Applebaum, details five 
deficiencies with Dr. Richards' examination and resulting 
diagnosis of Doby's depression, including failure to inquire 
about the most common symptoms of depression, failure to 
evaluate adequately her suicidality, failure to access 
collateral sources of data such as Doby's regular 
psychiatrist and Herbert Doby, a "grossly inadequate" 
mental status evaluation, and failure to explore less 
restrictive alternatives to involuntary commitment. The 
language of this report does suggest that Dr. Richards 
acted with gross negligence; Dr. Applebaum presents Dr. 
Richards as a highly incompetent psychiatrist, unfamiliar 
 
                                29 
  
with the basic medical definition of depression or its 
common symptoms and indifferent to the information he 
did gather. However, Dr. Applebaum's failure to discuss in 
any way the contents of the 11-page letter and the suicide 
note suggests a lack of familiarity with the basic facts of the 
case. See Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 
1142 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that expert opinion in the 
circumstance of that case should have been based on facts 
in the record). This apparent ignorance of Doby's writings, 
which represented crucial evidence of her mental state, 
undermines Dr. Applebaum's conclusions regarding Dr. 
Richards' actions. 
 
Considering the undisputed facts of this case, which 
showed that Doby had a history of depression and admitted 
to contemplating suicide, and that Dr. Richards had in his 
possession an extensive 11-page letter that even the Dobys' 
expert Dr. Bazelon concedes was "frightening," we agree 
with the district court's ruling "that the deficiencies noted 
by Drs. Applebaum and Bazelon could not amount to 
anything more than simple negligence by Dr. Richards." We 
also point out that courts should be cautious in allowing 
juries to deliberate on the liability of physicians making 
involuntary committments lest physicians decline to order 
committments when needed, thus possibly leading to 
unfortunate consequences. Cf. McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 
1083, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1992) (prison doctor allegedly giving 
false testimony and false diagnosis in commitment 
proceedings entitled to absolute immunity in action under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 in furtherance of policy to protect person 
functioning as part of judicial process from harassment and 
intimidation). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We will affirm both the district court's September 9, 1996 
order granting summary judgment to the defendants on a 
portion of the Dobys' claims and its March 10, 1998 order 
denying the Dobys' motion requesting a new trial, 
reconsideration of previous orders, and amendment of the 
judgment. 
 
                                30 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                31 
